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Language and thought dysfunction are central to the schizophrenia syndrome. They are
evident in the major symptoms of psychosis itself, particularly as disorganized language
output (positive thought disorder) and auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), and they
also manifest as abnormalities in both high-level semantic and contextual processing
and low-level perception. However, the literatures characterizing these abnormalities
have largely been separate and have sometimes provided mutually exclusive accounts
of aberrant language in schizophrenia. In this review, we propose that recent generative
probabilistic frameworks of language processing can provide crucial insights that link
these four lines of research. We first outline neural and cognitive evidence that real-time
language comprehension and production normally involve internal generative circuits
that propagate probabilistic predictions to perceptual cortices — predictions that are
incrementally updated based on prediction error signals as new inputs are encountered.
We then explain how disruptions to these circuits may compromise communicative
abilities in schizophrenia by reducing the efficiency and robustness of both high-
level language processing and low-level speech perception. We also argue that such
disruptions may contribute to the phenomenology of thought-disordered speech and
false perceptual inferences in the language system (i.e., AVHs). This perspective
suggests a number of productive avenues for future research that may elucidate not
only the mechanisms of language abnormalities in schizophrenia, but also promising
directions for cognitive rehabilitation.
Keywords: schizophrenia, language, generative models, speech perception, thought disorder, auditory verbal
hallucinations
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is a complex and heterogeneous brain disorder aﬀecting approximately one in 100
adults worldwide (Regier et al., 1993). In addition to its positive, negative, and disorganization
symptoms, it is characterized by abnormalities across multiple domains of cognition (e.g.,
Kuperberg and Heckers, 2000; Bowie and Harvey, 2006; Carter et al., 2008), as well as by
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abnormalities in lower-level perception (e.g., Green et al., 2009;
Javitt and Freedman, 2015). Language plays a central role in all
these aspects of schizophrenia. First, abnormalities in language
manifest in the major symptoms of psychosis itself, particularly
in disorganized language output (positive thought disorder)
and auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). Indeed, some of
these clinical language disturbances are evident in individuals
at high risk for developing the disorder (Klosterkötter et al.,
2001; Solomon et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2011). Second,
language dysfunction is one of the core cognitive sequelae of
schizophrenia, with verbal abilities often compromised relative
to other cognitive domains in both patients with schizophrenia
(e.g., Wexler et al., 1998; Wood et al., 2007), and in people at
risk for developing the disorder (Fuller et al., 2002; Lencz et al.,
2006; Pukrop et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2007; Fusar-Poli et al.,
2012; Koutsouleris et al., 2012). Third, patients’ diﬃculties with
encoding, representing, and categorizing auditory stimuli also
extend to the perceptual processing of speech (e.g., Cienfuegos
et al., 1999; Kasai et al., 2002; Fisher et al., 2008). Finally,
language abnormalities have been linked to functional and social
impairments (e.g., Holshausen et al., 2014).
Given the importance of language to so many aspects of
schizophrenia, it is not surprising that language has long been
a focal point of clinical and scientiﬁc interest in the disorder
(Bleuler, 1950). Nonetheless, the literature on language in
schizophrenia to date has been somewhat disjointed. One line
of research has focused on the incoherent speech associated
with thought disorder — the best known and most obvious
clinical manifestation of language dysfunction in schizophrenia
(Bleuler, 1950; Andreasen, 1986). Another line of research has
characterized abnormalities in comprehending the high-level
structure and meaning of sentences and discourse (for reviews,
see Kuperberg, 2010b; Boudewyn et al., 2012). A largely separate
literature has examined low-level sensory and perceptual deﬁcits
that aﬀect the processing of the acoustic and visual features that
make up spoken and written language (for a review, see Javitt
and Freedman, 2015). A fourth line of research has focused
on AVHs and the ability to distinguish one’s own inner speech
from external speech (for reviews, see Ditman and Kuperberg,
2005; Moseley et al., 2013). These diﬀerent dimensions of
language research in schizophrenia have often been investigated
by diﬀerent researchers with diﬀerent theoretical foci and
investigative tools, and there have been few eﬀorts to link them.
Here, we articulate one possible approach for bringing these
literatures together, based on an emerging generative framework
for understanding typical language processing (see Kuperberg
and Jaeger, 2015, for an overview).
Instead of focusing on how higher-order representations
are assembled from lower-level building blocks, hierarchical
generative frameworks of cognition focus on how higher-level
inferences about the world constrain the interpretation of sensory
information and how they are updated based on prediction error
(e.g., Friston, 2005, 2010; Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Hinton,
2007; Clark, 2013). It has been proposed that a breakdown of
generative circuitries is a fundamental abnormality underlying
schizophrenia (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Thus far, this theory
has mainly been discussed in relation to the emergence of
psychotic symptoms (e.g., Corlett et al., 2009, 2010; Fletcher
and Frith, 2009). In this review, we explore the hypothesis
that a breakdown of generative circuits proposed to underlie
typical language comprehension and production can explain the
multiple manifestations of language dysfunction in schizophrenia
outlined above. We argue that this theoretical framework
provides novel insights into potentially close relationships
between abnormalities of multiple dimensions of language
processing in schizophrenia. More generally, it highlights the
importance of characterizing the links between abstract, high-
level linguistic representations and low-level features of speech
or text.
We begin by outlining generative models of cognition
and their applications to understanding normal language
comprehension and production. We then consider the generative
circuit that links message level to lexical level representations,
discussing how its breakdown might lead to impairments
in comprehension in schizophrenia, and, in some patients,
to thought-disordered language output. Next, we consider
the generative circuits that further link message and lexical
levels to low-level perception, focusing on how disrupted links
between higher-level language representations and perceptual
systems might lead to abnormal speech perception and to
AVHs in schizophrenia. Finally, we dicsuss the implications
of this generative framework for understanding neural
abnormalities of language processing in schizophrenia, as
well as its implications for real-world psychosocial functioning
and cognitive remediation in schizophrenia.
A GENERATIVE FRAMEWORK OF
LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION AND
PRODUCTION IN HEALTHY
INDIVIDUALS
Generative Frameworks of Cognition and
Action: An Overview
At the core of generative frameworks are internal generative
circuits. In its simplest form, a generative circuit functions to
infer the underlying cause of a sensory signal (for reviews, see
Knill and Pouget, 2004; Chater and Manning, 2006; Griﬃths
et al., 2010; for introductory overviews, see Jacobs and Kruschke,
2011; Perfors et al., 2011), and a dynamic generative circuit
functions to incrementally infer the cause of a sensory signal
that unfolds over time. At any particular moment in time,
the agent may entertain multiple diﬀerent hypotheses about
this underlying cause and, to test these hypotheses, she can
use them to actively generate probabilistic predictions about the
sensorineural signal. At the next moment in time, the agent
will observe more of the sensory signal, and any discrepancy
between her predictions and the actual sensorineural signal —
prediction error — can be used to update her beliefs, i.e., lead her
to infer a new set of hypotheses about the underlying cause of the
sensory signal. These hypotheses are, in turn, used to generate
a new set of probabilistic predictions. By iteratively cycling
between inference and prediction, with the aim of reducing
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prediction error, a dynamic generative circuit will converge
upon the causal hypothesis that best explains the observed
sensory signal (e.g., Friston, 2005; Hinton, 2007; Clark, 2013).
While there are many diﬀerent ways of formalizing prediction
error, within a probabilistic computational framework, it is
closely linked to belief updating and inference over the agent’s
hypothesized perceptual and causal representations. Speciﬁcally,
prediction error can be formalized as Bayesian surprise — the
degree to which the agent’s belief shifts from her probabilistic
predictions about the observed sensory signal (the prior) to her
new probabilistic beliefs after observing new sensory input (the
posterior), as determined by Bayes’ rule (Doya et al., 2007).
On its own, this type of very simple generative circuit cannot
fully explain how we navigate our real-world environment. This
is because, at any given moment, the sensory inputs that we
encounter are enormously complex and multidimensional in
nature. In order to explain such complex inputs, we can draw
upon many diﬀerent types of knowledge stored at multiple
grains of representation. To give a concrete example, imagine
conversing with a close friend, who says, “Let’s go out”. Your
sensory input will include very complex patterns of acoustic and
visual information that correspond to the particular features of
your friend’s voice and face, information about sociolinguistic
factors such as her age, gender, and ethnicity, as well as semantic
and syntactic information about the content of the message
itself. In order to infer the underlying cause of this complex
pattern of sensory input (the fact that this particular friend has
asked you to go out), you will need to draw upon multiple
generative circuits, each corresponding to and linking these
diﬀerent types of representation, and organized in a hierarchical
fashion at increasing levels of abstraction. Together, these linked
generative circuits are said to comprise the agent’s internal
generative model (Friston, 2005; Hinton, 2007; Clark, 2013). By
linking perception with cognition, generative models can be
used to home in on the underlying cause of complex patterns
of sensory input by iteratively cycling between inference and
prediction, as described above. Probabilistic predictions are
actively propagated down the generative model at successively
lower levels of representation, enabling more accurate (and
often faster) recognition of consistent sensory input. Sensory
information that hasn’t been accurately predicted — prediction
error — is, in turn, passed up the model in a bottom-up fashion
to successively higher levels of the generative model, and is used
to update the agent’s beliefs about the underlying latent cause.
This continues until prediction error across the entire generative
model is minimized.
Importantly, we live in a world that is constantly changing
and, because we do not have unbounded cognitive or metabolic
resources or time, we must continually modify our goals and
adapt to the broader situational context in which we ﬁnd
ourselves (see Qian et al., 2012 for discussion). One way in
which an agent can rationally allocate her limited resources
(see Simon, 1956; Howes et al., 2009; Griﬃths et al., 2015) is
to estimate the precision of her prior knowledge at any given
level of representation, as well as the reliability of new inputs
to that representational level (based on past experience), and
use these estimates to modulate the degree to which she updates
her beliefs (i.e., “weight” her prediction error, see Feldman and
Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010). As we discus further below, this
can, in turn, inﬂuence the general direction of information ﬂow
across the agent’s generative model (top-down versus bottom-up)
and therefore the rate at which the agent adapts to her broader
contextual environment.
Generative models not only link cognition and perception;
they also link action and perception. This is because our
knowledge of our own action plans can be used to generate
predictions about intermediate action states as well as the sensory
consequences of the planned action (cf. forward models, e.g.,
Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992; Guenther et al., 1994;Wolpert et al.,
1995). Once again, the overarching goal of the agent is to home
in on the representation at highest level of the hierarchy (the
action plan) by minimizing prediction error (Bayesian surprise)
across the entire generative model. And once again, the primary
direction of information ﬂow across the generative model can be
inﬂuenced by the agent’s estimates of the precision of her priors
and the reliability of new inputs (for discussion, see Adams et al.,
2013a). As we will see later, such estimates also play an important
role in allowing us to maintain the belief that we (rather than
external events or agents) are the source of these action plans.
The hierarchical organization of generative models makes
them particularly well suited as a theoretical approach to
understanding the comprehension and production of language,
which is composed of numerous hierarchically organized levels
of representation. These representations include elemental sound
units (phonemes), words (lexical items), the intonation and
rhythm of phrases (prosody), the structure and meaning of
sentences (syntax, semantics), and the relations between multiple
sentences (discourse). These levels of representation essentially
act as a code for transferring message-level representations
from one person to another. The ultimate goal of language
comprehension is to infer the message that the producer intended
to convey from noisy and ambiguous sensory signals, and the
ultimate goal of language production is to produce a sequence of
such signals that eﬃciently and successfully communicates one’s
intended message to other people’s minds. Below we discuss how
the generative framework recasts the means by these goals are
accomplished.
A Generative Framework of Language
Comprehension
Traditional frameworks have largely conceptualized language
comprehension as a feed-forward building process: low-level
features of the bottom-up perceptual input are mapped onto
sublexical or lexical representations (e.g., Marslen-Wilson,
1987; Norris, 1994; Norris and McQueen, 2008; Grainger and
Holcomb, 2009), which are, in turn, combined together to
construct syntactic and semantic structures to build a higher
message-level meaning (e.g., MacDonald et al., 1994; Jackendoﬀ,
2007).
Within a generative framework, comprehension is
conceptualized in quite a diﬀerent way — as a process of
generating top-down predictions in order to test hypotheses, and
of updating these hypotheses based on new evidence (see Farmer
et al., 2013, and Kuperberg and Jaeger, 2015, for discussion).
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Within this framework, our aim, ﬁrst and foremost, is to infer
the latent cause of incoming observations. We typically start
out with high uncertainty about this cause. However, as new
bottom-up evidence comes in, we update our higher-level
hypotheses (beliefs) such that we home in on the cause of the
inputs with increasing certainty (see, e.g., Levy, 2008, for a
generative framework for syntactic parsing and Kleinschmidt
and Jaeger, 2015, for a generative framework for phonetic
adaptation). Within a hierarchical generative framework of
comprehension (language understanding), the latent cause that
the comprehender must infer is the underlying message that the
speaker or writer intended to communicate, and the bottom-up
input is the sensory signal, which can be encoded at multiple
levels of representation (e.g., phonological, semantic, syntactic).
Within an actively generative framework, we can test our higher-
level hypotheses about the underlying message that causes this
sensory signal by actively generating predictions at lower levels of
representation, prior to the bottom-up input arriving and being
decoded at these lower levels (see Kuperberg and Jaeger, 2015).1
For example, hypotheses about the overall message-levelmeaning
can lead to predictions about upcoming words, which, in turn,
can lead to predictions about upcoming acoustic-phonetic
features. These predictions play an essential role in enabling us to
extract signals from noisy channels in real time because they can
“explain away” predictable aspects of the linguistic input. Any
discrepancies between these predictions and the actual unfolding
linguistic input — prediction error — are propagated back up
the generative model, allowing us to incrementally update our
higher-level hypotheses about the underlying message, enabling
us to better infer the communicative intentions of the speaker or
writer.
Importantly, our generative models are not ﬁxed, but rather
change constantly as we learn about and respond to our ever-
changing environmental inputs. One way in which we may
calibrate the rate at which we adapt language comprehension to
the demands of any given communicative situation is to estimate
the precision of our prior beliefs at a given representational level
and the reliability of new inputs to that level (see Kleinschmidt
and Jaeger, 2015, for related discussion). To give a concrete
example, imagine meeting an unfamiliar person in a quiet
room. In this situation, we expect our prior beliefs about that
person’s voice to be relatively imprecise. However, based on our
knowledge about sensory inputs in quiet rooms, we estimate
the incoming sensory data to be fairly reliable. Based on these
estimates, we should increase the degree of belief updating at
perceptual levels of representation by relying more on new
evidence than our prior beliefs. This means that there will be
more prediction error (Bayesian surprise) being passed up to
higher levels of the hierarchy, and so the ﬂow of information
across the generative model will primarily be bottom-up. This will
allow us to learn from our environmental input relatively quickly,
such that we converge rapidly on the underlying higher-level
cognitive cause of the features of the speaker’s voice— associating
1Most traditional models do acknowledge an important role of prediction in
ensuring eﬃcient and reliable comprehension. However, it is not seen as a driving
force behind comprehension itself.
these features with a speciﬁc speaker. This situation can be
contrasted with conversing with an old friend at a noisy party.
In this case, we estimate our prior beliefs about our friend’s voice
to be very precise and, indeed, we may draw upon a generative
model that corresponds directly to the features of our friend’s
voice. On the other hand, based on our knowledge of noisy
parties, we estimate any incoming sensory data to be unreliable.
Together, these estimates can be used to ramp down belief
updating— that is, we stick to our priors such that any prediction
error is minimal. There will therefore be little passing of
information up the generativemodel, and the ﬂow of information
across the generative model will be primarily top-down. This way
of thinking about language highlights fundamental links between
language processing, language acquisition and lifelong language
adaptation (Chang et al., 2006; Jaeger and Snider, 2013; Dell and
Chang, 2014).
A Generative Framework of Language
Production
Generative frameworks also conceptualize aspects of language
production somewhat diﬀerently from classical frameworks.
Traditionally, theories of language production have focused
primarily on the processes by which messages are encoded
at successively lower levels of representation, culminating
in the articulation of linguistic signals (e.g., Dell, 1986;
Levelt, 1993; Bock and Levelt, 1994). That is, the particular
message that the producer plans is assumed to feed into
production mechanisms that ultimately translate this message
into auditory or visual signals. While there may be interactive
activation between adjacent levels of representation during the
encoding process, information primarily ﬂows from higher
to lower levels. Viewing the language production architecture
instead in terms of hierarchically organized generative circuits
places a stronger emphasis on feedback from lower to
higher levels. Within this generative framework, just ahead
of executing the actual speech plan, producers use their
generative models to generate predictions at successively lower
levels of representations (e.g., semantic, syntactic, phonological).
Upon encountering new evidence, priors at each of these
representational levels are updated to posteriors, and any
shift in belief – Bayesian surprise or prediction error – is
propagated back up the generative model, ensuring that the
producer’s production plan is updated in real time. This
feedback and updating plays a critical role in monitoring
speech production (see also Pickering and Garrod, 2007,
2013).2 As we discuss below, the source of new evidence
that leads to belief updating (and therefore prediction error)
2Classical frameworks of language production also acknowledge an important
role of monitoring – both internal monitoring (e.g., Levelt, 1983; Postma, 2000;
Hartsuiker and Kolk, 2001) and external monitoring of one’s interlocutor for
comprehension (e.g., Clark and Krych, 2004). In many of these models, however,
monitoring is conceptualized as a separate ‘add-on’ mechanism designed to
minimize speech errors, that is taken over by either the comprehension system
(Levelt, 1983) or by a distinct executive mechanism (but see Dell, 1986, 2013 for
discussions of how loops of cascading forward and feedback activation between
units at adjacent levels of the systemmay function to instantiate such monitoring).
Within a generative architecture, monitoring arises as an inevitable consequence
of the overarching goal of minimizing overall prediction error in transmitting a
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diﬀers depending on whether monitoring is internal or
external.
Internal monitoring ensures that any speech errors are edited
out, and that the sounds, words and sentence structures that
we actually produce are consistent with our original message-
level intentions. It entails predicting our own production
plans prior to articulation, and so the new incoming evidence
that leads to updating of prior predictions comes from the
execution of the speech plan itself. For example, predictions
(priors) at the phonological level will be updated when the
production plan is encoded at this level, and any resulting
shift in belief (prediction error) will be passed up the model,
leading the speaker to rapidly update her beliefs at higher
levels of representation “on the ﬂy” – either the message
itself, or her semantic or syntactic representations. As a result,
the message the speaker conveys, or the semantic/syntactic
representations used to express this message, will be congruent
with the phonemes that she has selected for articulation (for
evidence for adaptive internal monitoring, see Severens et al.,
2011; Dhooge and Hartsuiker, 2012), and prediction error
will be reduced across the entire generative model. Moreover,
in addition to this type of internal feedback monitoring,
speakers also have at their disposal another way of reducing
prediction error across the generative model: they can actually
act on their environment to fulﬁll their own predictions,
resulting in production facilitation. For example, predictions
at the phonemic level may be used to facilitate the selection
of phonemic information encoded by the speech plan itself,
ensuring that the precise elements that are ultimately produced
are maximally compatible with the speaker’s original message-
level intentions3.
Important factors that may inﬂuence the route by which
prediction error is minimized – internal feedback monitoring
or production facilitation – are the producer’s estimates of
the precision of her prior beliefs (e.g., determined by the
speciﬁcity of her communicative goals) and her estimates of
the reliability of new evidence (e.g., determined by demands
on cognitive resources or her past experience with her own
productions). As discussed above for comprehension, these
estimates of precision and reliability are thought to inﬂuence the
degree of belief updating at any given level of representation,
eﬀectively weighting the prediction error. Internal feedback
monitoring is most likely to occur if a speaker has estimated
her production plan to be relatively imprecise (e.g., because
her communicative goals are relatively general). In this case,
shifts in belief (prediction error) will be large and will be
propagated up the generative model, leading the speaker to
adjust her speech plan in real time, as described above. In
contrast, production facilitation is most likely to occur if the
speaker has estimated her production plan to be highly precise
(e.g., because her message-level intention is very speciﬁc). In
message-level representation from one mind to another (Jaeger and Ferreira, 2013;
Jaeger and Snider, 2013).
3More generally, it has been proposed that top-down predictionsmay play this type
of role in facilitating action, e.g., by facilitating reﬂexive movements that eﬀectively
correct prediction errors and ensure that action outcomes approximate what is
predicted (Adams et al., 2013a; Brown et al., 2013).
this case, the ﬂow of activity across the producer’s generative
model will be primarily top-down, with any small remaining
prediction error largely resolved by using predictions to
facilitate the selection of information at relatively low levels of
representation.
External monitoring ensures that our speech output is
calibrated to the needs of the comprehender. It entails predicting
the perceptual consequences of the output that we produce,
e.g., the sounds of our own voices, as well as our interlocutor’s
comprehension, and so the new incoming evidence that leads
to updating of prior predictions comes from the external world,
just as in comprehension. So, for example, if we had predicted
that our voice would sound loud, but the auditory feedback
we receive indicates that it sounds soft, then a relatively large
prediction error will be passed up the generative model leading us
to speak louder. Or if we had estimated that our comprehender
would understand what we had said, but the feedback we
receive suggests otherwise, then the resulting large prediction
error will pass up the generative model, leading us to update
our speech plan (either the message itself, or the semantic or
syntactic representations we use to express it), thereby enabling
us to adapt our production to our interlocutors’ abilities in
real time. In this way, we can improve the odds of successful
communication.
Although prediction errors play a critical role in language
production by enabling monitoring, it is important to note
that these errors will generally be small, and much smaller
than the prediction errors produced during comprehension.
This is because when we produce our own speech, we have
access to our own communicative intentions, our utterance
plans, and even our articulatory motor plans, and so our
predictions will generally be highly accurate, “explaining away”
much of the eﬀects of our own speech plans and the
consequences of our articulation. Moreover, we will generally
estimate our predictions to be more reliable during our
own productions than during comprehension when we lack
direct access to our interlocutor’s message-level intentions
and speech plan. This means that, even if the prior and
input are kept constant at any given level of representation,
prediction errors that result from self-generated linguistic
input will generally be smaller (and therefore down-weighted)
than prediction errors that result from externally generated
linguistic input. At a perceptual level, this attenuation of
prediction error can be detected experimentally as reduced neural
response evoked by sensory inputs resulting from self-generated
speech versus other-generated speech (e.g., Creutzfeldt et al.,
1989).
The attenuation of prediction error during production versus
comprehension is thought to play an important role in helping
us maintain the inference that our own speech production
originates from ourselves rather than from external agents (for
discussion in relation to self-monitoring of action more generally,
see Blakemore et al., 1999; Martikainen et al., 2005; Bays et al.,
2006; Aliu et al., 2009; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Hesse et al.,
2010). As we will discuss further below, a breakdown in this
self-monitoring may lead to the phenomenon of AVHs in
schizophrenia.
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HIGHER ORDER LANGUAGE
DYSFUNCTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA:
DISRUPTIONS IN THE GENERATIVE
CIRCUIT LINKING MESSAGE-LEVEL
AND LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS
In this section, we propose that a breakdown of the generative
circuit that links message-level to semantic and lexical
representations contributes to the phenomenology of thought
disorder, as well as to analogous abnormalities of higher-order
comprehension in schizophrenia.
Positive thought disorder — the incoherent and disorganized
language output that is seen in some patients — is perhaps
the most obvious manifestation of language dysfunction in
schizophrenia. Thought disorder manifests variably across
patients (and sometimes within an individual patient across
diﬀerent communicative situations). It can include tangential
leaps in the message being expressed (Bleuler, 1950; Chaika,
1974; Andreasen, 1979a,b, 1986) as well as a so-called “loosening
of associations” (Bleuler, 1950) – a tendency to produce
semantically associated words that are only indirectly related
or completely unrelated to the overall message being conveyed
(Andreasen, 1979a,b, 1986).
Although thought disorder manifests clinically in only a
subset of schizophrenia patients, there is now a body of work
suggesting that patients, both with and without clinical evidence
of thought disorder, can show a set of related phenomena
during language comprehension including a relative insensitivity
to overall sentence (Kuperberg et al., 1998, 2006a) and discourse
(Ditman et al., 2011) coherence, and an over-dependence on
the individual meanings or semantic relationships between
individual words (for reviews, see Kuperberg, 2010a,b; Boudewyn
et al., 2012). Here, we ﬁrst discuss how such higher-order
comprehension abnormalities can be understood as arising from
a disruption of the generative circuit that links message-level and
lexical representations. We then relate this perspective to the
production phenomena associated with thought disorder itself.
Abnormalities of Higher-level Language
Comprehension in Schizophrenia
In healthy individuals, a generative circuit between message-
level and lexical representations plays a crucial role in real-
time language comprehension. As language unfolds word by
word, we use our message-level hypotheses (based on the
preceding linguistic and non-linguistic context and our real
world knowledge) to generate predictions about the most likely
semantic features of upcoming words, and the meanings of
incoming words are assessed in the light of these predictions.
This fast and pro-active use of context allows us to rapidly
resolve the inherent ambiguity of incoming words. For example,
when processing lexically ambiguous homophones (words that
share the same sounds but diﬀer in meaning, e.g., “bank”)
in isolation, we normally activate both the dominant meaning
(“ﬁnancial institution”) as well as less frequent subordinate
meanings (e.g., “terrain alongside a river”). We also activate
its semantic neighbors — other words that are semantically
associated with and/or share semantic features with each
of these diﬀerent senses of “bank”. However, encountering
“bank” in a sentence context that biases toward its subordinate
meaning (“river bank”) will lead to this subordinate meaning
(and its associated semantic neighbors) being activated at
the very earliest moments of semantic processing (Li and
Yip, 1998; Huettig and Altmann, 2007; Calacouris and Brock,
2009)4.
We have known since classic experiments by Chapman
et al. (1964) that patients with schizophrenia are impaired in
their ability to correctly interpret the contextually appropriate
meaning of homophones. More recent studies have established
that such impairments manifest very quickly during real-time
comprehension (e.g., Titone et al., 2000; Sitnikova et al., 2002).
For example, when an ambiguous word appears in a context
that biases strongly toward its subordinate interpretation, healthy
adults show electrophysiological signatures of rapid contextual
facilitation of subsequent words that are semantically congruent
with this meaning. In contrast, patients’ neural responses are
primarily determined by the more dominant meaning rather than
the contextually supported meaning (Sitnikova et al., 2002). This
ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that, unlike healthy controls,
patients fail to use message-level representations to predict the
subordinate features of the homographs.
A breakdown in this generative circuitry may also help
explain the abnormal activation of semantic neighbors in
schizophrenia. As noted above, the context in which we
encounter any given word will constrain which of its semantic
neighbors we activate and to what degree. If patients fail
to use generative circuits to predict an upcoming semantic
input, they might indiscriminately activate a much broader
set of semantic neighbors when new input is encountered.
This may lead them to over-rely on semantic associations
between individual words to make sense of language during
word-by-word comprehension.5 On this account, patients’
impairments in their use of higher-order context should
be functionally linked to their over-dependence on semantic
associations (Kuperberg et al., 2006a; Ditman et al., 2011; Swaab
4Early studies of lexical ambiguity resolution suggested that eﬀects of context on
homophone interpretation were delayed relative to the initial retrieval of potential
alternativemeanings (Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al., 1979). However, subsequent
studies usingmore sensitive on-linemeasures and ﬁne-grainedmanipulations have
qualiﬁed this ﬁnding, suggesting complex interactions between multiple graded
factors such as strength of contextual constraint, relative frequency of alternative
interpretations, and timing (e.g., Duﬀy et al., 1988; Li and Yip, 1998; Dixon and
Twilley, 1999; Calacouris and Brock, 2009), such that context appears to have
delayed eﬀects only when all available sources of evidence, taken together, do not
strongly favor one alternative over another.
5Some researchers have characterized this problemas a failure to suppress activated
lexical representations that are incongruous with sentence context (e.g., Titone
et al., 2000). This possibility is more in keeping with traditional models of language
comprehension positing that the incoming language signal activates successively
higher-level or more abstract linguistic representations primarily from the bottom-
up, and that context acts to constrain interpretation at a later stage of processing
(e.g., Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al., 1979). That is, multiple possible words
are ﬁrst activated, and contextually inappropriate or less likely words are then
suppressed. Our proposal, in contrast, is that, by informing our inferences and
predictions, contextual information normally constrains the set of alternatives that
are considered, even prior to encountering the incoming language signal, and that
it is a breakdown of these generative processes that gives rise to indiscriminate
activation of semantic neighborhoods in schizophrenia.
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et al., 2013). Consistent with this idea, an over-reliance on
lexical associations can lead patients to come to erroneous
interpretations of sentences (Kuperberg et al., 2006b) or to
establish inappropriate referential links across sentences (Ditman
et al., 2011).
Finally, a breakdown in this generative circuitry may help
explain patients’ diﬃculties with comprehending non-literal
language. This is because, in healthy individuals, this circuitry
may aid our comprehension of certain types of ﬁgures of
speech. For example, when processing the sentence “John
had a long happy life, but last week he ﬁnally kicked the
bucket”, we normally use our message-level hypotheses to predict
the idiomatic expression, “kicked the bucket”, as a whole,
without needing to ﬁrst activate each incoming word from
the bottom-up to construct its literal meaning. Moreover, in
comprehending less conventionalized non-literal language, such
as unfamiliar metaphor, we may beneﬁt from switching to
or learning new generative models that allow us to infer the
intended underlying meaning. In schizophrenia, a breakdown
of generative mechanisms may account for a tendency to
interpret metaphoric or ﬁgurative language in overly literal ways
(Chapman, 1960; Titone et al., 2002; Brune and Bodenstein, 2005;
Kiang et al., 2007).
Importantly, a breakdown in the generative mechanisms that
normally bridge message-level hypotheses and lexical activation
does not imply that patients cannot use higher-order context at
all. The crucial point is that in healthy individuals, generative
circuits act very rapidly by generating predictions before new
input is fully accessed from the bottom-up. While patients may
be unable to mobilize context quickly enough to generate such
predictions, they may still be able to use a higher message-level
representation to inﬂuence interpretation after the bottom-up
input has been fully accessed. Some preliminary evidence for
this hypothesis comes from a study in our lab investigating
the interpretation of ambiguous spoken instructions (Rabagliati
et al., 2014). We showed that patients with schizophrenia
were able to eﬀectively use two diﬀerent types of high-level
context (conversational discourse context and broad visual
context) to inﬂuence their ﬁnal interpretation of these spoken
instructions. However, examination of measures that reﬂected
word-by-word comprehension revealed that, unlike healthy
adults, patients failed to use these high-level contexts to inﬂuence
their incremental interpretation of the instruction as it unfolded
in real time.
Exactly why schizophrenia patients seem unable to use
strong prior beliefs to predictively pre-activate upcoming
input as quickly as healthy individuals remains unclear. One
hypothesis, however, is that the impairment stems from a
general tendency of patients to underestimate the precision of
their prior predictions (see Adams et al., 2013b). As discussed
above, the ability to use such estimations of precision may
play an important role in modulating the degree of Bayesian
updating for a given prior and likelihood function (weighting
the prediction error). This, in turn, ensures that the balance of
top-down versus bottom-up information ﬂow across a generative
model is calibrated to our broader contextual environment.
In schizophrenia, a tendency to discount the precision of
prior predictions would lead to an overweighting of prediction
error and to a relative over-dependence on bottom-up activity.
Thus, patients would engage with language in a primarily
reactive fashion, rather than in a more eﬃcient predictive
fashion.
Many of the comprehension abnormalities described above
are seen in patients both with and without clinical manifestations
of thought disorder. There is, however, some evidence for
processing abnormalities that are speciﬁc to thought disorder:
under conditions that encourage automatic stimulus processing,
thought disordered patients can show larger automatic semantic
priming eﬀects than non-thought disordered patients and healthy
controls, particularly when the semantic associations in question
are indirect – that is, when the prime and target words are
not themselves related, but are both semantically related to a
non-presented mediator word (e.g., lion – stripes, where the
mediating word is tiger; Spitzer et al., 1993; Weisbrod et al., 1998;
Moritz et al., 2001, 2002; Kreher et al., 2009).6 This has been
taken as evidence that thought disordered patients exhibit more
widespread activation of semantic networks to words presented
in isolation (the prime words in these studies) than healthy adults
or patients without thought disorder.
The ﬁnding that even words presented in isolation can evoke
abnormal patterns of semantic activation in thought disordered
patients may initially seem somewhat at odds with the generative
perspective, which we have thus far discussed in relation
to patients’ diﬃculties with interpreting language in context.
However, they make more sense if we consider the clinical
manifestation of thought disorder as reﬂecting a particularly
severe breakdown of generative circuits. As noted in the previous
section, generative circuits function not only to ensure eﬃciency
of language processing; they also play a critical role in allowing
us to learn and adapt our internal representations. As discussed
above, disruptions of generative models in schizophrenia would
lead to highly abnormal and unresolved lexical prediction errors
to words presented in context. If this disruption was particularly
severe, then, over time, these abnormal prediction errors might
interfere with the maintenance of stable lexical representations.
Thus, rather than being ﬁnely tuned for mapping speciﬁc lexical
forms on to speciﬁc semantic features, lexical mappings would
become noisier. Therefore, a particular lexical input, even when
presented in isolation, might inappropriately activate multiple
related semantic representations, leading to indiscriminate and
unconstrained semantic activity. This wouldmanifest as an overly
inclusive lexico-semantic network, which is consistent with the
observations described above (see also Mathalon et al., 2002,
2010).
As we will discuss next, this type of severe breakdown of
generative circuits linking high-level message representations
and lexical representations might also impact language
production in schizophrenia, thereby leading to the clinical
manifestation of thought disorder itself.
6Semantic priming under more controlled strategic conditions, however, is
generally reduced in schizophrenia patients, both with and without thought
disorder (reviewed in Kuperberg et al., 2008), perhaps as a result of the breakdown
of generative circuits that link lexical representations with other higher-level
representations, such as those describing semantic relationships across words.
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Abnormal Language Production: Toward
an Understanding of Thought Disorder
Within a generative framework, the essential goal of language
production is to communicate an intended message to one’s
interlocutor’s mind with minimum error during transmission
(Jaeger and Ferreira, 2013). To do this successfully, the
speaker generates predictions about the internal and external
consequences of her message plan at multiple levels of
representation, and she can use this prediction error to adjust
the language production process itself (internal and external
monitoring).
Within this framework, the generative circuit linking message-
level and lexical representations plays a critical role in ensuring
that the words selected during production are congruous with
the message that the speaker aims to convey. If the speaker
is not quite certain of what she intends to say and has
therefore estimated her message-level predictions to be relatively
imprecise, then any discrepancies between her predictions and
activity at the lexical level when the production plan is actually
encoded (prediction error signals) will be propagated back up the
generative model and used to adjust her message and production
plan such that they are consistent with the lexical choice that
she has selected (internal monitoring). If, however, the speaker
has estimated that her intended message and its downstream
encoding are highly precise, then any top-down predictions
based on this message may actually be used to facilitate the
selection of those lexical items that are most consistent with
the overall message, thereby ensuring that inappropriate lexical
associates are not articulated. Together, both these routes ensure
that the overall prediction error across the generative model is
minimized, that free-associative lexical activity is excluded, and
that the message communicated is coherent with respect to the
speaker’s intended message (see also Dell, 1986; Dell and Chang,
2014).
In schizophrenia, a reduction in the propagation of top-down
predictions down the generative model, and an over-dependence
on bottom-up processing, would therefore lead to the following
consequences. First, the resulting inappropriately large
prediction error would feed back up to the message-level
representation, triggering inappropriate shifts in the message-
level representation — an over-adjustment of the production
plan. This would lead to the tangentiality and derailment
that characterize thought-disordered speech. Second, lexico-
semantic selection would be relatively unconstrained, with
lexical associates that are incongruous with the overall message
going largely uncorrected and intruding into speech output.
This would lead to the ‘loosening of associations’ that can
also characterize thought disorder. As discussed above, it is
possible this reduced prediction in patients stems from a general
tendency to underestimate the precision of their own speech
plans (see Adams et al., 2013b, for simulations of a simple
communication system using a predictive coding formalization,
which provide evidence that a reduction of precision at higher
levels of a generative model can reduce the capacity to make
accurate lower-level predictions, rendering all new inputs
surprising).
Finally, although most work has focused on the
generative circuit linking message-level and lexico-semantic
representations, it is possible that a disruption of other generative
circuits during language production might also contribute to the
phenomenology of thought disorder. For example, a disruption
of the circuitry linking message or semantic-level representations
to phonological representations may sometimes lead to the
intrusion of phonologically related items into the speech output
(so-called “clang associations”; Bleuler, 1950; Chaika, 1974;
Andreasen, 1979a; Spitzer et al., 1994). And a failure to monitor
signs that the comprehender is not grasping the intended
message might contribute to the failure of communication that
can characterize thought disorder (Chaika, 1974; Harrow et al.,
1989). Indeed, if, as has been hypothesized, the prediction
error that generative models in production aim to minimize
is the outcome of the entire inference process that constitutes
comprehension (Jaeger and Ferreira, 2013; Lind et al., 2014a),
then a failure to take the comprehender into account may,
to a large extent, drive abnormal monitoring at other levels
of the system in thought disorder (for early discussions of
this idea, see Cohen, 1976; Harrow et al., 1989; MacGrath,
1991).
SPEECH PERCEPTIONS AND AUDITORY
VERBAL HALLUCINATIONS:
DISRUPTIONS IN THE GENERATIVE
CIRCUIT LINKING HIGHER-LEVEL
LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS AND
LOW-LEVEL PERCEPTION
In this section, we extend the proposal introduced in the previous
section by suggesting that a disruption of the generative circuits
that link message-level and lexical representations extends all the
way down to lower-level perceptual representations, and that this
might help explain both the phenomena associated with AVHs
as well as the perceptual language abnormalities observed in
schizophrenia.
The phenomenon of hearing voices — the perception of
speech in the absence of an actual external speech stimulus — is
the most common symptom of schizophrenia overall, aﬀecting an
estimated 60–70% of patients (World Health Organization, 1973;
Andreasen and Flaum, 1991). It is important to recognize that
AVHs are not merely arbitrary sounds; they are fully linguistic in
nature, often containing rich detail at multiple levels of linguistic
representation, ranging from speciﬁc, elaborate message-level
content to auditory perceptual and prosodic features that
distinguish diﬀerent “speakers” along dimensions such as gender,
age, accent, and speaking style (Nayani and David, 1996; Garrett
and Silva, 2003; Stephane et al., 2003).
While AVHs are the most obvious clinical manifestation
of perceptual language disturbances in schizophrenia, there
is also evidence that patients, even those without AVHs,
experience low-level sensory and perceptual disturbances
(e.g., Adler et al., 1982; Holcomb et al., 1995; Rabinowicz
et al., 2000; Turetsky et al., 2009; Micoulaud-Franchi et al.,
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2011) including abnormalities in the perception of speech
sounds.7 These speech perception abnormalities have mostly
been discussed and investigated separately from the higher-
order language comprehension abnormalities discussed
in the previous section. They have also been considered
separately from the literature on AVHs. Here, we discuss the
possibility that these lower-level processing abnormalities can
be understood as arising from a disruption of the generative
circuits that link message-level and lexical representations
all the way down to low-level perceptual representations.
We then relate this perspective to the phenomenon of AVH
itself.
Abnormalities of Low-level Speech
Perception in Schizophrenia
Speech is an acoustically complex and rapidly time-varying
auditory signal whose basic elements – phonemes – diﬀer
from each other along numerous but very subtle acoustic
dimensions (e.g., Ladefoged, 1975). It is therefore unsurprising
that schizophrenia patients’ diﬃculties with perceiving and
categorizing low-level auditory stimuli (see Introduction) extend
to these complex speech sounds. Patients have less precise
representations of how acoustic features map onto phonemes
than healthy adults (Cienfuegos et al., 1999), and also show
impairments in mapping these features onto more complex
or abstract representations, such as emotional tone of voice
(Leitman et al., 2005).
As noted above, low-level auditory and speech perception
deﬁcits in schizophrenia have generally been investigated
independently of higher-level language processing abnormalities.
To the extent that some researchers have considered potential
relations between speech perception and higher-level language
processing, they have hypothesized that early perceptual and
sensory abnormalities in schizophrenia are the root cause
of upstream disruptions to such higher-order representations
and processes (e.g., Javitt, 2009; Javitt and Freedman, 2015).
The evidence taken to support this hypothesis comes from
observations that patients’ ability to perceive emotional or
sarcastic tones of voice is correlated with their low-level pitch
perception and duration discrimination abilities (Leitman et al.,
2005; Jahshan et al., 2013; Kantrowitz et al., 2014). Similarly,
reading dysfunction in schizophrenia is correlated with low-
level auditory and visual perception abilities (Revheim et al.,
2014). However, these observations have generally been limited
to correlational eﬀects in a handful of domains, leaving open
questions about the scope and causal direction of relations
between perception and interpretation abnormalities. In fact,
the observed phenomena are just as consistent with the
converse view: that disrupted generative models are the primary
deﬁcit, with low-level perceptual language abnormalities in
schizophrenia stemming from a failure of generative models to
accurately predict incoming sensory data (see Hemsley, 1993, for
similar ideas).
7Although most of the research described in this section pertains to the auditory
processing of speech, the principles and concepts described in this section also
extend to the visual processing of written language.
In healthy individuals, there is now a large body of evidence
suggesting that the accurate perception of speech sounds is
highly dependent on a dynamic use of contextual information
(e.g., Newman et al., 2001; Allen et al., 2004; Pardo and Remez,
2006; McMurray and Jongman, 2011). This is necessary for
us to overcome a major computational challenge to spoken
language comprehension — the so-called lack of invariance
problem (Liberman et al., 1967). The /b/ in “ba”, for example, has
quite diﬀerent acoustic features from the /b/ in “bee” (Delattre
et al., 1952). And two diﬀerent speakers saying “ba” may (and
probably will) produce considerably diﬀerent acoustic patterns
(e.g., Johnson and Wright, 1990), to the extent that one speaker’s
“ba” might eﬀectively be another speaker’s “pa”. Yet, despite this
pervasive acoustic variability and ambiguity, we are remarkably
good at interpreting acoustic patterns as the phonemes that the
speaker intended to say.
Generative circuits linking message-level and perceptual
representations can help us solve this lack of invariance problem
by enabling us to predict not only the meanings of words
(as discussed in the previous section), but also the sounds of
upcoming information in the speech signal. These perceptual
predictions constrain our interpretations of incoming acoustic
information and can even “ﬁll in” gaps in the speech stream
(Warren, 1970). To generate such perceptual predictions, we
are able to draw upon any representation that is higher than
the lowest level perceptual representations. For example, we
can use lexical knowledge to make perceptual inferences about
ambiguous speech sounds: a speech sound that is acoustically
ambiguous between /f/ and /sh/ is generally perceived as /f/
when it is presented in a string like da?odil and as /sh/ when
it is presented in a string like na?ional (Ganong, 1980). We
can also use message-level representations to predict and infer
the phonology of particular words (DeLong et al., 2005). And
we routinely use our knowledge about individual speakers and
groups of speakers to make more general predictions about pitch
contours, rhythm, and speech style, even when we do not have
strong predictions about the exact phonemes we will hear (e.g.,
King and Sumner, 2014; Brown et al., 2015a,b; for a recent review,
see Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015).
A second way in which these generative circuits can resolve
the lack of invariance problem is by enabling listeners to quickly
adapt to their current linguistic environment. As discussed in
Section “A generative framework of language comprehension and
production in healthy individuals,” any errors in our predictions
will lead not only to more eﬀective inference, but also to learning
and adaptation either by adjusting our knowledge about the
contingencies or mappings between the representations that
deﬁne our existing generative models, or by switching to a
diﬀerent generative model that better describes the statistical
properties of the input. At the phonemic level, for example,
encountering many slightly mispronounced versions of a
phoneme (e.g., /b/) will lead to systematic prediction errors at the
phonemic level. These will, in turn, lead listeners to adjust their
internal mappings from cue to category to accommodate future
deviant pronunciations (phoneme recalibration; Norris et al.,
2003; Kraljic and Samuel, 2005). The converse is also true: hearing
several highly prototypical pronunciations of /b/, without the
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natural variation in production that listeners typically encounter,
leads listeners to narrow their /b/ representation to exclude even
slightly deviant pronunciations (selective adaptation; Vroomen
et al., 2004; see Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015 for a computational
model).
In schizophrenia, there is little work examining eﬀects of
context on speech perception. However, an early study suggested
that patients’ speech percepts deviate much more strikingly
from those of healthy adults when words are presented in a
connected narrative than when they are presented one at a time
(Lawson et al., 1964). Moreover, speech processing deﬁcits in
schizophrenia are especially pronounced when the task involves
perceiving speech in noisy conditions (Hoﬀman et al., 1999; Wu
et al., 2012) – conditions in which healthy adults rely particularly
strongly on contextual prediction (e.g., Davis and Johnsrude,
2007).
There is even less consensus concerning patients’ ability to
generate predictions or use prediction error to adjust their
phoneme representations. On the one hand, when several /b/s
are followed by a /p/, patients with schizophrenia show a smaller
mismatch negativity eﬀect than that of control participants (Kasai
et al., 2002), suggesting abnormal perceptual error signals to
unexpected phonemes (see Todd et al., 2013 for a more general
review of the mismatch negativity in schizophrenia). On the
other hand, patients show apparently normal selective adaptation
eﬀects when exposed to phonemes in isolation (see Cienfuegos
et al., 1999, although it is possible that the parameters of the
paradigm used in this study indexed local contrast eﬀects rather
than true phoneme adaptation; see Samuel, 1986, for evidence
that such mechanisms can drive eﬀects in this paradigm under
certain conditions).
If, as we hypothesize, low-level perceptual abnormalities
in schizophrenia are related to a dysfunction of generative
circuits, this raises numerous questions about what types of
higher-level dimensions of language comprehension (such as
syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and discourse) patients are able
to take into account when processing low-level speech sounds
(as well as low-level visual representations). Given that we
rarely hear isolated speech sounds in everyday communication,
addressing these questions would likely provide additional
insight into patients’ capacities in a wider range of real-
world communicative contexts. Paradoxically, a reduced use
of higher-level representations to interpret speech sounds
could lead to situations in which patients with schizophrenia
might perceive speech more veridically than healthy adults.
For example, it may be the case that patients are in fact
“better” at perceiving prototypical pronunciations of phonemes
(i.e., how they would be pronounced in isolation) in contexts
in which typical participants would expect non-prototypical
pronunciations (e.g., due to phonetic overlap with surrounding
phonemes, or due to speaker-speciﬁc factors such as foreign
accent).
Finally, it is possible that a particularly severe breakdown
of these generative circuitries between higher-level and low-
level perceptual representations might, over time, lead to weaker
or noisier mappings between perceptual inputs and the low-
level phonetic or phonemic representations themselves. In
other words, if patients with schizophrenia are less able to
leverage sentence and word context when processing speech
stimuli, then this would lead to a failure to appropriately
adapt not only at the level of these higher-level representations,
but also at levels lower down the hierarchy. Inappropriately
large prediction error to predictable phonemes presented in
context would mean that, over time, rather than maintaining
ﬁne-grained mappings between acoustic inputs and phonemic
and phonetic representations, these mappings would become
noisier and inappropriately activated, even to phonemes
and words presented in isolation. Thus, even though the
generative perspective predicts that patients would show
more diﬃculties with perceiving speech sounds in context,
some patients may also show a degradation of low-level
perceptual representations, with changes in their sensitivity
to sensory stimuli even when presented in isolation. This
would imply that disruptions in aspects of low-level speech
might arise as a downstream consequence of disruptions
in higher-order generative models. And, if this is the case,
auditory and speech processing deﬁcits would be expected
to correlate with higher-level comprehension abilities in
schizophrenia, as has been reported (Leitman et al., 2005;
Jahshan et al., 2013; Kantrowitz et al., 2014; Revheim et al.,
2014).
Where Perception Meets Production:
Toward an Understanding of Auditory
Verbal Hallucinations
We now turn to the question of how a severe breakdown of the
generative circuits between high-level message representations
and low-level perceptual representations might impact aspects of
language production in schizophrenia, and account for the clinical
manifestation of AVHs.
The generative framework of language production that we
outlined above entails monitoring (via prediction and updating)
of both production-internal mechanisms as well as the perceptual
consequences of our own speech plans in order to ensure
that the intended message reaches the interlocutor’s mind with
minimum error during transmission (Jaeger and Ferreira, 2013).
This whole process may well draw on the same generative
circuits discussed above that link message-level and lexical
representations all the way down to lower-level phonological and
perceptual representations.
As discussed above, our prediction errors are much smaller
when we hear ourselves speaking than when we hear others
speaking. This is both because our predictions about the
eﬀects of our own speech plans are much more accurate
than our predictions about the eﬀects of others’ speech, and
because we estimate our own speech plans to be highly
reliable, leading us to attenuate any belief updating (and down-
weight prediction error). This attenuation of prediction error
to self-generated speech is thought to play an important role
in allowing us to maintain a strong sense of agency over
our own speech production — both the speech we produce
(Sugimori et al., 2013; Lind et al., 2014a), as well as the
phonological representations and articulatory representations
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that may be activated without actual speech production (i.e.,
covert speech)8.
In schizophrenia, a severe breakdown of the generative
connections between message-level, semantic, phonological,
and perceptual representations may disrupt the causal links
between the intention to speak (whether overtly or covertly)
and the predicted consequences of these speech plans, resulting
in relatively large prediction errors at multiple levels of the
generative hierarchy. That is, patients may be less able to use
stored higher-level representations to predict the consequences
of activating semantic, syntactic phonological and articulatory
representations ahead of encoding the speech plan at these levels,
possibly because they underestimate the precision of higher-level
message representations, as discussed above (see Adams et al.,
2013b). Further, patients may also under-estimate the reliability
of activity at the lower perceptual levels, possibly as a secondary
consequence of reductions in estimates of precision at higher
levels of the hierarchy (see Adams et al., 2013b, for evidence
using simulations of simple communication systems). These
reduced estimates of reliability of activity at low-level perceptual
representations would lead to relatively more belief updating
at these levels (an up-weighting of prediction error) and an
increased bottom-up ﬂow of activity up the generative hierarchy
to self-generated messages, just as in comprehension. This, in
turn, may alter patients’ inferences about the source of the entire
production, such that they infer that it originates from some
unknown external agent, rather than from themselves. From
this perspective, AVHs may be abnormal percepts that result
from failures to explain away both the sensory and linguistic
consequences of self-generated messages (see also Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013b).
Some evidence to support this idea comes from studies of
perceptual external self-monitoring during speech production in
schizophrenia. First, in series of ERP studies, Ford and Mathalon
(2005) and Ford et al. (2007) compared a sensory ERP waveform
(the N1 component) to self- vs. externally generated speech
sounds. The N1 ERP component elicited by the onset of a speech
sound is normally attenuated when the speech sound is produced
by the participant, rather than by another speaker, reﬂecting the
attenuation of a sensory prediction error. This was not the case
in schizophrenia, supporting the idea that patients may fail to
attenuate sensory prediction error resulting from self-produced
speech. Further, this lack of attenuation was associated with
reduced neural synchrony between frontal and temporal brain
regions, suggesting a neural dissociation between generative
models and low-level perceptual cortices (Ford et al., 2007). Of
note, both these abnormalities were observed not only in patients
experiencing AVHs, but also in non-hallucinating patients (Ford
and Mathalon, 2005).
Second, another series of studies examined patients’ ability
to identify the source of self-generated words after artiﬁcially
inducing a large perceptual prediction error. This was done by
routing participants’ vocal output through a device that distorted
8The activation of these representations may or may not consciously be
experienced as “inner speech” – the internal monologue? that some individuals
experience on a regular basis, and that we generally correctly perceive as happening
inside our own heads (e.g., Vygotsky, 1987).
their speech and playing it back to them over headphones in
real time, so that no delay was detected between speaking and
hearing (e.g., Johns and McGuire, 1999; Johns et al., 2001; Allen
et al., 2004). The main ﬁnding from these studies was that
patients were more likely to misattribute their own distorted
speech to an external voice than healthy controls, particularly
when the words in question were derogatory (as opposed to
neutral or positively valenced; Johns and McGuire, 1999; Johns
et al., 2001). Unlike the studies by Ford and Mathalon (2005)
and Ford et al. (2007), this abnormality appeared to be fairly
speciﬁc for patients experiencing AVHs. This may be because
participants were producing words with semantic content, which
is more likely to have engaged the circuitry that links semantic
to perceptual representations — a component of the generative
circuitry that we hypothesize to be disrupted in patients with
AVHs.
Importantly, the theory advanced here goes beyond the idea
that AVHs arise from a speciﬁc breakdown of a perceptual self-
monitor that links intentions to generate inner speech with
percepts (Frith, 1992). Rather, by conceptualizing AVHs in
schizophrenia as originating from a breakdown in hierarchically
organized generative circuits, it predicts that patients with AVHs
will show abnormally large prediction errors not only at the level
of percepts but also at higher levels of the generative hierarchy.
Some preliminary evidence consistent with this idea comes from
observations that patients with schizophrenia use fewer ﬁrst-
person pronouns and self-oriented content words, and more
third-person pronouns and externally oriented content words,
than patients with mood or anxiety disorders (Fineberg et al.,
2015a). It is possible that, as patients become more likely to
attribute their own speech to an external source, the content of
their utterances likewise develops an increasingly external focus.
It will, however, be important for future studies to directly
test the hypothesis that patients with AVHs show abnormalities
of monitoring at higher levels of representation. One fruitful
avenue of research may be to take advantage of a novel form
of real-time speech perturbation that has been used to examine
how high-level semantic monitoring is aﬀected by auditory
feedback from one’s own voice (Lind et al., 2014a,b). In these
experiments, rather than merely perturbing the acoustic features
of a participant’s output during articulation, auditory feedback
from the participant’s voice is replaced entirely by a recording
of his own voice uttering an entirely diﬀerent word (e.g., the
speaker says “gray” and hears “green”).Many healthy participants
actually fail to detect these incongruences, remaining blind to
the real-time speech manipulation. Further, when probed to
repeat their response, on many non-detected incongruent trials,
they explicitly report having said the substituted word, even
though their initial production was in fact a diﬀerent word. In
other words, on these trials, healthy participants appear to have
updated their own initial communicative intentions on the basis
of the perceptual prediction error, to maintain the inference that
they were the source of the word they heard. This supports
the idea that there are close inferential links between speech
perception and semantic self-monitoring in healthy adults, as
discussed above. If, as we hypothesize, a breakdown in the
circuitry linking message-level and perceptual representations
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contributes to AVHs in schizophrenia, then, despite perceptual
prediction error being larger than in controls, patients may fail to
update their own message-level production plans on the basis of
this prediction error, and, as a result, may be less likely to report
having said the substituted word on these trials. That is, they
may be more accurate than control participants in their reports
of what they actually said9.
Finally, patients who have diﬃculties with determining the
source of their own speech might also have diﬃculties with
perceiving and distinctly representing speech from multiple
(external) talkers. That is, if AVHs arise from abnormalities
in the generative architecture that normally enables us to
determine the source of linguistic signals, source attribution
problems should not be limited to the ability to discriminate
between one’s own speech and external speech. Instead,
breakdowns in generative circuits supporting inferences about
the sources of linguistic signals should lead to more general
problems with using these mechanisms to discriminate between
multiple potential speakers. This would further compound the
diﬃculties that patients experience in real-world communicative
situations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING
THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF LANGUAGE
DYSFUNCTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Framing language dysfunction in schizophrenia in terms of
generative models connects with neurobiological evidence
that schizophrenia is a disconnection syndrome, characterized
by abnormalities in both structural and functional brain
connectivity (Friston and Frith, 1995; Friston, 1998; Stephan
et al., 2006; Cannon, 2015). In healthy individuals, predictive
processing of the unfolding linguistic input and the use of
prediction error to update message-level representations are?
thought to depend crucially on the integrity of fast, parallel
9It has been proposed that an analogous breakdown of agency over our own
“thought” accounts for delusions (Currie, 2000; Currie and Jureidini, 2001).
While the representations underlying thought and their relationship to the
representations underlying language remain a topic of philosophical debate, one
proposal is that propositional thought is mediated by a complex combinatorial
semantic system (Jackendoﬀ, 2002; Pinker, 2007; see also Hinzen, 2013). This may
include metaphorical and metonymic models that allow us to map certain abstract
concepts on to other domains, e.g., being scared or angry mapping to feeling
possessed by devils (Lakoﬀ, 1971; Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 2008). A loss of agency over
such a systemmight, for example, lead a thought like, “I am possessed by devils”, to
be perceived as being possessed by devils that originate in the real world (Rhodes
and Jakes, 2004; Fineberg et al., 2015b), or a thought like, “I am like Jesus”, to be
perceived as the real-world state, “I am Jesus” (Hinzen, 2015). Similarly, transitory
thoughts about innocuous real-world eventsmay also lead patients to perceive such
events as highly salient and self-relevant (Kapur, 2003; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
Within the generative framework proposed here, this loss of agency may arise from
a breakdown of the circuitry that links thought with underlying interpretations
or beliefs about real-world events/states. A failure to explain away or attenuate
prediction error at the level of thought (see also Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett
et al., 2010) might lead to patients’ subjective conviction that their own thoughts
stem from real-world external events or states, even though, unlike true beliefs,
there is often little attempt to justify them based on objective evidence (Berrios,
1991; Currie and Jureidini, 2001; Hinzen, 2015).
connections between perceptual cortices and the neural loci
of stored language knowledge at multiple hierarchical levels
of representation, across prefrontal, temporal and parietal
cortices (Hickok and Poeppel, 2007; Kuperberg, 2007; Baggio
and Hagoort, 2011; Friederici, 2012; Price, 2012; Hagoort,
2013). Patients with schizophrenia exhibit structural changes
across the prefrontal, temporal, and inferior parietal cortices
that make up this language network (Shenton et al., 2001;
Kuperberg et al., 2003; Wisco et al., 2007; Catani et al.,
2011; Schneiderman et al., 2011; Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012).
Patients also show abnormal functional connectivity between
these regions during the resting state (e.g., Garrity et al.,
2007; Hinkley et al., 2010; Liemburg et al., 2012). A full
understanding of how such functional dysconnectivity gives
rise to the symptoms and speciﬁc perceptual and cognitive
dysfunctions that characterize schizophrenia requires the use of
paradigms that speciﬁcally probe the relevant cognitive processes.
While a full discussion of this work is beyond the scope of
this review, we highlight a few lines of research that may be
particularly relevant to generative circuitries discussed in the
sections above.
The Generative Circuit Linking
Message-level and Lexical
Representations
First, consider the message-to-lexical generative circuit. In
healthy adults, diﬀerent aspects of lexical processing may be
mediated by diﬀerent ‘hubs’ within the temporal cortex. For
example, the left posterior middle/superior temporal cortex
(post-M/STG) may play a role in mapping the word-form
(e.g., phonological) on to syntactic and semantic representations
(Hickok and Poeppel, 2007; Martin, 2007; Lau et al., 2008;
Binder et al., 2009); the left anterior superior temporal cortex
may map word-form on to semantic representations; and more
inferior parts of the anterior temporal cortex may play a role in
mapping widely distributed conceptual-semantic features on to
amodal semantic representations (Patterson et al., 2007; Price,
2012; see also McCarthy et al., 1995; Nobre and McCarthy,
1995). All these temporal regions are reciprocally connected
to frontal cortices. For example, the left post-M/STG shows
both functional and structural connections with the left inferior
frontal cortex (Catani et al., 2007; Snijders et al., 2010), and
these two regions are often co-activated during lexico-semantic
processing (e.g., Rodd et al., 2005, 2012; Gold et al., 2006).
Integrating what we know about this frontotemporal language
processing network with our assumptions about how generative
models function in the brain, we speculate that, during higher-
level comprehension, activity evoked within temporal regions by
incoming words is attenuated to be commensurate with how
accurately and conﬁdently we have already used to context to
predict the semantic, syntactic and word-form properties of the
incoming word. For example, large prediction error signals at
the level of syntactic, semantic and word-form features (e.g.,
to an incoming word following a sentential context that does
not constrain for any of these properties) may be associated
with increased activity within the left posterior M/STG. In
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contrast, large prediction error signals at the level of just semantic
and word-form features (e.g., to incoming words following
contexts that constrain only for the syntactic properties of
incoming words, or to unrelated words in semantic priming
paradigms where there is no need to access syntactic features
at all) may be associated with increased activity within the
left anterior superior temporal gyrus. While functional MRI
lacks the temporal resolution necessary to evaluate this claim,
consistent evidence comes from multimodal neuroimaging
studies of both automatic and predictive semantic priming in
healthy adults, which show that neural activity within the left
anterior STG is rapidly suppressed when a target word follows
a semantically related (versus unrelated) word (Lau et al., 2013,
2014).
Patients with schizophrenia exhibit abnormal functional
connectivity between inferior frontal and temporal cortices
during semantic processing tasks (Wolf et al., 2007; Griego
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Woodward et al., 2015). If, as we
suggest above, these functional connections indeed form the
neural substrate of the message-to-lexical generative circuitry,
this disrupted functional connectivity in schizophrenia may be
related to abnormalities in semantic and lexical processing in
schizophrenia. On this account, an abnormally large semantic
prediction error in schizophrenia should be associated with
abnormally strong (i.e., non-attenuated) activity in temporal
cortices in response to words that would normally be predictable
in context. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis.
During semantic priming, schizophrenia patients (Han et al.,
2007; Kuperberg et al., 2007), as well as people at familial high
risk for schizophrenia (Thermenos et al., 2013), show more
activity within temporal cortices to semantically associated than
unrelated word-pairs. Similar abnormal increases in activity
within temporal cortices, together with abnormal decreases
in frontal activity, are observed when patients engage in
demanding semantic tasks such as deep semantic encoding,
semantic retrieval (Kubicki et al., 2003; Ragland et al., 2004),
and the comprehension of semantically implausible sentences
(Kuperberg et al., 2008).
We know even less about how a breakdown of this neural
circuitry might impact speech production in schizophrenia,
leading to positive thought disorder. However, it is worth
noting that severity of thought disorder in patients is negatively
correlated with both the volume of left superior temporal gyrus
(Shenton et al., 1992; Rajarethinam et al., 2000) and with activity
of the left superior temporal gyrus during speech production
(McGuire et al., 1998; Kircher et al., 2001), but positively
correlated with activity in anterior inferior temporal cortices
(McGuire et al., 1998). In healthy individuals, the production
of speech is associated with less activity within the left anterior
superior temporal cortex compared to the pauses in between
clauses, perhaps because wordform-semantic (lexical) activity
to self-produced words is largely “explained away” by prior
predictions generated during speech planning. This diﬀerence
is not seen in thought-disordered patients (Matsumoto et al.,
2013), perhaps because patients fail to attenuate prediction
error signals within inferior temporal cortices to self-produced
words.
The Generative Circuit Linking
Higher-level Linguistic Representations
and Low-level Perception
There is also evidence for abnormalities in the structure and
function of brain regions involved in the perceptual processing
of language in schizophrenia. For example, abnormalities around
the left superior temporal gyrus, including primary auditory
cortex, are well documented (e.g., Pearlson, 1997; Shenton et al.,
2001; Steen et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2009). These abnormalities
in low-level sensory cortex, together with the abnormalities
described above, may contribute to disrupted generative circuits
linking higher-level language processing with speech perception.
In healthy adults, predictions that are generated at relatively
high levels of linguistic representation are propagated all the way
down to sensory cortex, attenuating neural responses to expected
stimuli. For example, contra the view that primary auditory cortex
merely detects and relays information about acoustic features
to higher-level association areas, diﬀerent interpretations of the
same ambiguous speech sound are associated with distinct neural
signals in primary auditory cortex (Kilian-Hütten et al., 2011).
In addition, the ability of auditory cortex to track and entrain
to speech rhythm is stronger for intelligible speech (whose
rhythmic properties are to an extent predictable from linguistic
context) than for unintelligible speech (Peelle et al., 2013).
Other studies have manipulated predictability more explicitly,
ﬁnding, for example, that the neural response within the superior
temporal gyrus is attenuated when spoken words match (versus
mismatch) the content of prior written text (Sohoglu et al., 2012).
Likewise, in the visual domain, syntactically unexpected printed
words elicit stronger activation within occipital cortex than
syntactically expected words, particularly when a syntactically
unexpected word has low-level visual form features that are
atypical of the expected syntactic category (Dikker et al.,
2010).
Taken together, the ﬁndings described above suggest that,
in healthy individuals, neural activity within perceptual regions
is mainly evoked by stimuli that are unexpected rather than
expected. There is some evidence suggesting that this may
not be true in patients with schizophrenia. For example, the
repetition of syllables under noisy conditions elicits stronger (i.e.,
less attenuated) neural responses in primary auditory cortex in
patients than in healthy adults (Dale et al., 2009). In patients,
reductions in the volume of the superior temporal gyrus (e.g.,
Delisi et al., 1994; Kasai et al., 2003; Chance et al., 2004)
are associated with weaker prediction error signals: relatively
more attenuation of neural responses to deviant auditory stimuli
(McCarley et al., 1993).
Many of the studies investigating the structure and function
of perceptual cortices in schizophrenia have subdivided patients
according to whether they experience AVHs. Most such
studies have found more pronounced structural and functional
abnormalities in patients with hallucinations (although see, e.g.,
Woodruﬀ et al., 1997). AVHs are correlated, for example, with
the extent of volumetric reduction in superior temporal gyrus,
including Heschl’s gyrus (e.g., Levitan et al., 1999; Rajarethinam
et al., 2000; Gaser et al., 2004; Sumich et al., 2005). In addition,
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as outlined below, there is evidence that abnormal modulation
of temporal cortices as well as abnormal frontotemporal
functional connectivity are particularly pronounced in patients
with hallucinations (Ford et al., 2002; Mechelli et al., 2007;
Hashimoto et al., 2010; Oertel et al., 2010).
First, patients who experience AVHs exhibit abnormal
patterns of functional connectivity and neural synchrony
between left Heschl’s gyrus and surrounding brain regions
involved in semantic and lexical language processing, memory,
and other higher-level cognitive functions (e.g., Ford et al.,
2002; Sommer et al., 2012; Shinn et al., 2013; de la Iglesia-
Vaya et al., 2014). Second, whereas patients without AVHs and
healthy adults exhibit stronger eﬀective connectivity between
left superior temporal regions and anterior cingulate cortex
when hearing speech from another speaker (versus their
own pre-recorded speech), patients with AVHs instead exhibit
stronger eﬀective connectivity between these regions when
hearing their own (versus another speaker’s) voice (Mechelli
et al., 2007). Third, when hearing speech stimuli that vary
in predictability, patients actively experiencing AVHs generate
weaker prediction error signals in primary auditory cortex
to unpredictable stimuli (as well as omissions of expected
stimuli) than healthy adults, and the magnitude of these
prediction error signals is negatively correlated with neural
signatures of AVHs within auditory cortex (Horga et al.,
2014). Finally, there is some evidence that these weaker
prediction error signals may be related to fronto-temporal
dysconnectivity: ERP studies of the mismatch negativity (MMN)
indicate that patients with AVHs, unlike patients without AVHs
or healthy adults, show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in MMN
amplitudes to speech deviants at frontal sites, and instead
exhibit MMN eﬀects primarily at temporal sites (Fisher et al.,
2008). Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest links between
abnormalities in the structure and connectivity of auditory
cortex, abnormal prediction error, and the phenomenology of
AVHs.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL
FUNCTION AND COGNITIVE
REMEDIATION
Thus far, we have primarily focused on the theoretical
implications of characterizing perceptual, cognitive, and
symptomatic sequelae of schizophrenia as consequences of
disrupted generative models. We turn now to discussing how
this perspective on language abnormalities might inﬂuence our
understanding of real-world communicative dysfunction in
schizophrenia, as well as the targeted development of cognitive
and psychosocial remediation techniques to address such
dysfunction.
Psychosocial Communicative Function
When most clinicians think of language dysfunction in
schizophrenia, they tend to focus on the symptoms of thought
disorder and AVHs — the aspects of language dysfunction that
are most easily diagnosed and characterized from a clinical
perspective. As we have explained in this review, schizophrenia
is associated with multiple pervasive abnormalities in both the
higher- and lower-order aspects of language processing, and this
is true not just of patients with thought disorder and AVHs, but
also of patients without these overt symptoms. Such disturbances
of language processing may not necessarily be detected on
standard clinical interviews, which generally rely on fairly
simple prompts and interchanges. Nor would they necessarily be
detected on standard neuropsychological tools used to evaluate
schizophrenia patients, which do not generally include measures
that probe language comprehension. Importantly, however, such
abnormalities in language processing are still likely to contribute
considerably to psychosocial dysfunction in schizophrenia. We
know, for example, that verbal memory performance predicts
success in various forms of verbal therapy (Smith et al.,
1999) and is associated with social, adaptive, and occupational
success (Green et al., 2000; Holshausen et al., 2014). And, as
discussed further below, many of the components or outcome
measures of psychosocial and cognitive intervention programs
are actually linguistic in nature. These include, for example,
measures of conversational turn-taking skills, which are part of
assessments of psychosocial skills and abilities (Hooley, 2010),
and measures of patients’ ability to carry out actions based on
spoken instructions, which are part of perceptual and cognitive
training programs (e.g., Adcock et al., 2009; Fisher et al., 2009,
2015).
Language processing abnormalities, stemming from
dysfunction of generative circuitry, are particularly likely to
compromise real-world social communicative function in
schizophrenia for at least three related reasons. First, in real-
world communicative situations, we rarely hear individual words
or speech sounds in isolation. Language is instead typically
presented in phrases, sentences, text, and conversation, and
is therefore highly context-dependent. As discussed above,
predictions based on this high-level context are critical for us
to disambiguate individual words and the low-level perceptual
features of speech. Thus, problems that patients have in
making higher-order causal inferences about the sources of
linguistic signals (i.e., communicative intentions) and using these
inferences predictively to accurately interpret incoming sensory
data would likely be exacerbated in real-world communicative
situations.
Second, in typical everyday communication, linguistic
information does not unfold one sentence at a time with
multi-second gaps in between utterances, as it does in many
lab experiments. Rather, spoken language proceeds very quickly
(approximately 5–8 syllables per second; Pellegrino et al., 2007)
at a pace that is largely outside the listener’s control. Thus,
any impairments in mobilizing higher-order representations
to predict upcoming input would also likely be exacerbated
in real-world communication. Moreover, while patients’
reliance on reactive feed-forward processing mechanisms might
allow them to compensate and perform adequately on simple
comprehension tasks, it would lead to considerable diﬃculties
in interactive conversation, which requires individuals not only
to produce and comprehend language in real time, but also to
rapidly coordinate complex sequences of conversational turns
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with their interlocutors (e.g., Schegloﬀ, 2000; Clark and Krych,
2004; de Ruiter et al., 2006; Stivers et al., 2009).
Third, in real-world communication, we must constantly and
ﬂexibly adapt language comprehension and production to the
ever-changing demands of our social environment. As discussed
throughout this review, we are able to use the discrepancies
between our predictions and the actual input – as conveyed
through prediction error signals – to adjust or switch to internal
generative models of our conversational partners. In this way,
we quickly adapt to how diﬀerent speakers’ acoustic features and
semantic and syntactic preferences cluster together, and adjust
what we say in response to accommodate their preferences and
expectations (Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015). In schizophrenia,
any failure to anticipate and compensate for contextually
conditioned variation in language input will put patients at a
processing disadvantage. This may be related to the cognitive
rigidity and perseveration that can characterize language in
schizophrenia (Cameron, 1944; Cohen, 1976; Andreasen, 1979a;
Manschreck et al., 1985; Barr et al., 1989), and that may
contribute to patients’ impairments in adapting to diﬀerent social
situations (Harrow et al., 1989).
These three factors highlight the importance of research that
focuses on patients’ capacities in a wider range of real-world
communicative contexts and that examines the mechanisms
of comprehension breakdown in situations that more closely
approximate real-world language use, such as interactive
communication. This work could perhaps derive inspiration
from elegant psycholinguistic paradigms designed to investigate
interactive communication at multiple levels of representation
in naturalistic contexts without sacriﬁcing experimental control
(e.g., Clark, 1992; Keysar et al., 2000; Sedivy, 2003; Clark and
Krych, 2004; Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2006; Brown-
Schmidt and Konopka, 2011). In addition, our hypothesis
that time-sensitive predictive language processing is particularly
compromised in patients with schizophrenia makes it especially
important to use techniques that give insights into the time
course of processing, such as eye tracking, ERPs, and EEG/MEG.
Comparing measures of real-time processing with responses
elicited from patients in the absence of time pressure on the same
tasks could shed further light on processing routes that may be
relatively spared and could be targeted for cognitive remediation
and prevention, as discussed below.
Intervention Strategies
The theoretical perspective we oﬀer here has important
implications for psychosocial and cognitive rehabilitation
strategies, which seek to increase patients’ quality of life both
directly and indirectly via links between cognitive or perceptual
function and psychosocial or everyday functional skills (Wykes
and Huddy, 2009). A wide variety of cognitive remediation
approaches are currently used in schizophrenia. They can be
broadly divided into three classes of approaches.
The ﬁrst involves real-world psychosocial skills training,
which aims to support patients’ skills in both interpreting and
responding to social situations (e.g., Wallace and Liberman, 1985;
Benton and Schroeder, 1990; Wallace et al., 1992; Scott and
Dixon, 1995; Heinssen et al., 2000; Bellack, 2004). Psychosocial
skills training includes methods ranging from explicit skills
instruction and coaching to the modeling and rehearsal of
target behaviors in unstructured, structured, and controlled (via
confederate) interactions. Because communication is central to
social interaction, many of these target behaviors are verbal,
with a primary focus at the level of inferring and expressing
communicative intentions. This type of training generally targets
patients’ performance within speciﬁc functional domains, and its
eﬀectiveness has not been found to generalize to other domains.
On the other hand, any eﬀects that communicative skills training
might have on more general language communicative abilities
remain largely unassessed.
A second class of approaches focuses on high-level cognitive
training, which aims to improve cognitive or meta-cognitive
abilities, such as working memory, problem solving, attention,
or learning styles (reviewed by Medalia and Choi, 2009). This
approach is motivated by evidence for links between cognitive
dysfunction and psychosocial dysfunction in schizophrenia
(e.g., Breier et al., 1991; Bowie et al., 2010). Cognitive
training approaches do not target language skills directly, but
instead target more “domain-general” cognitive functions, which
are sometimes assumed to underlie language abilities. For
example, problems in using high-level context during language
comprehension may be compounded by or even reducible
to problems with maintaining message-level representations
within working memory and/or impairments in domain-general
“cognitive control” mechanisms (e.g., Cohen and Servan-
Schreiber, 1992; Boudewyn et al., 2012), although the extent
to which this is the case is open to debate (for discussion, see
Kuperberg, 2010b). The core assumption of cognitive training
approaches then, is that improving domain-general cognitive
abilities like working memory and cognitive control should
lead to improved real-world psychosocial functioning, including
communicative functioning. And indeed, meta-analyses of the
eﬀectiveness of cognitive remediation techniques generally ﬁnd
some degree of transfer from speciﬁcally trained domains tomore
general measures of daily functioning (e.g., Medalia and Choi,
2009; Wykes et al., 2011).
Finally, a third set of approaches focuses instead on low-
level perceptual training tasks (e.g., Adcock et al., 2009; Fisher
et al., 2009, 2015; Norton et al., 2011; Popov et al., 2011;
Biagianti and Vinogradov, 2013). These tasks gradually increase
in complexity over the course of training. Notably, many of
them use auditory stimuli and have clear relevance for language
processing. For example, auditory perceptual training includes
tasks ranging from basic perceptual discrimination of auditory
stimuli with rising or falling pitch, to more complex verbal
tasks, like performing actions based on spoken instructions
(Adcock et al., 2009; Fisher et al., 2009, 2015). The assumption
of these types of programs is that targeting low-level perceptual
representations enhances the quality of sensory information
available to higher-level cognitive operations such as language
comprehension, and that this will therefore gradually improve
overall cognitive and functional outcomes. This assumption
is shared by theoretical views that sensory abnormalities in
schizophrenia are the root cause of upstream disruptions
to higher-order representations and processes (Javitt, 2009;
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Javitt and Freedman, 2015). Evaluations of perceptual training
techniques have generally found some degree of transfer to more
global measures of cognition (e.g., Fisher et al., 2009, 2015),
though it is less clear whether gains translate to functional
outcomes.
Despite their diﬀerent approaches, these three types of
remediation programs – those that target psychosocial skills,
high-level cognitive processes, and low-level sensory processing –
all yield moderate to strong gains on performance within targeted
domains (e.g., Heinssen et al., 2000; Bellack, 2004; Reddy et al.,
2014). However, the mechanisms underlying the success of
cognitive and perceptual remediation programs, both within
and across domains, are not well understood. Responsiveness
to remediation is heterogeneous across patients, and few factors
have been identiﬁed that predict whether an individual will
beneﬁt from remediation (Medalia and Choi, 2009). We suggest
that the similarities in eﬃcacy across diﬀerent programs of
remediation is consistent with the idea that the core dysfunction
in schizophrenia is not speciﬁc to individual perceptual or
cognitive domains, but instead lies in mechanisms that link
these domains. We further suggest that these cross-domain
mechanisms involve the breakdown of generative circuits linking
higher-level cognitive representations and processes to lower-
level perception.
Viewing cognitive remediation through the lens of generative
models makes a further prediction: that the combination of
high- and low-level approaches might actually have synergistic
rather than additive eﬀects on overall cognitive and perceptual
functioning. Targeting high-level processes and representations
using high-level cognitive training approaches should improve
functioning across levels by supporting patients’ internal models
of context and their ability to link prior knowledge to incoming
stimuli. Conversely, improving patients’ sensory representations
using lower-level perceptual training approaches should improve
functioning at higher levels of representation by decreasing
uncompensated prediction error throughout the generative
model. Supporting processing at multiple levels of representation
in tandem may therefore make it easier to remedy the self-
reinforcing cycle of disrupted prediction and uncompensated
prediction error than targeting either end of this cycle in
isolation.
The development of comprehensive combined remediation
programs may also hold promise for linking perceptual
and cognitive gains to higher-order behavioral, social, and
occupational function. There is already some evidence that
is consistent with this idea. The most eﬀective strategy for
transferring neurocognitive gains associated with high-level
cognitive remediation to improvements in real-world behaviors
and functioning has been to pair high-level cognitive remediation
with psychosocial therapy or functional skills training (e.g.,
McGurk et al., 2005; Bowie et al., 2012; Reddy et al., 2014).
Again, the mechanisms that support transfer between these
domains are not well understood. However, these observations
provide additional support for the utility of viewing language
as an integrated system of perception, cognition, and action, in
which abstract behavioral and social goals are integrally linked to
cognitive processes and low-level perception.
Finally, it may be fruitful to explore the eﬃcacy of a
combined remediation approach for preventing or mitigating
the onset of psychosis in individuals at high risk for developing
schizophrenia. Both language abnormalities (e.g., Fuller et al.,
2002; Simon et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2007; Solomon et al.,
2011; Thompson et al., 2011) and social diﬃculties (Hans
et al., 2000; Cornblatt et al., 2007) are detectable prior to
the onset of the illness, possibly reﬂecting some link in their
developmental trajectory. Indeed, the generative perspective
suggests that the inferential, predictive, and adaptive processes
that we engage in typical adult language processing are in fact the
same processes involved in language learning and development.
Extended to schizophrenia, this perspective connects with recent
work discussing neurodevelopmental aspects of schizophrenia
in relation to CNS development throughout the lifespan
(Nour and Howes, 2015). More generally, the generative
perspective on language abnormalities in schizophrenia strongly
suggests that targeting psychosocial, cognitive, and perceptual
abilities early in the course of schizophrenia may provide
the best window of opportunity for bringing the vicious
cycle of abnormal prediction and belief updating back under
control.
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